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Maria Scarpati
We seem to have an intuitive grasp on the idea that somemetaphysical items
– be they properties, states of affairs or truths and parts of reality however con-
ceived – involve the identity of some entities in particular. As opposed to these,
it seems, there are features of themetaphysical realm thatmight as well be char-
acterized merely in terms of their qualitative profile. They may concern some
entities, but they do so only insofar as those entities fulfil a given qualitative de-
scription; were there to be perfect duplicates of an entity, items of the latter kind
would concern (if at all) any one of that entity’s duplicates. Call the first class of
items, collectively, "the non-qualitative"; call the latter, collectively, "the quali-
tative". A number of worries and quarrels have focused on this distinction and,
in particular, on the status of the non-qualitative. Some of the relevant worries
are genuinely, and possibly solely, modal: they typically constitute part of the
debate about Haecceitism. Some, however, seem to go beyond a merely modal
dispute, and lead us to wonder about which (if any) among the qualitative and
the non-qualitative is metaphysically prior. Both (families of) debates have a
classical reference in Robert Adams’s inquiry as towhether "theworld – and (. . . )
all possible worlds – [are] constituted by purely qualitative facts, or (. . . ) thisness
hold[s] a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality" (henceforth,
"Adams’s question").1
However – as far as I know – Shamik Dasgupta was the first to cast the latter
dispute (i.e., the one that goes beyond modal issues and explicitly asks about
metaphysical priority ones) in terms of the ever so hotly debated theory of gro-
unding. In recent papers, he has very effectively defended a view according to
1Adams, (1979, p. 5). The notion of a "thisness", as conceived by Adams, is cognate to that of
a haecceitas, historically attributed to Duns Scotus – though, for several reasons, the two cannot
be plainly identified. A thisness of a given entity a would be the property of being a – or, which is
the same, of being identical with a. For the sake of our present aims, we may just read "the non-
qualitative" where Adams writes "thisness" in the passage I quoted, and "the qualitative" where he
writes "suchness" – though a thorough justification of this construal of mine lies beyond the scope
of this review.
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which – roughly – every constituent of reality is either qualitative or grounded
in the qualitative. In this critical essay, I will present and briefly comment Das-
gupta’s proposal.
In linewithmany theorists of the concept,Dasgupta takes grounding tobean
explanatory notion of a particular (non-causal) kind – the one that is supposed
to convey the "in virtue of "-relation. Claiming that a fact is grounded in some
other fact is to claim that the former obtains in virtue of the latter’s obtaining –
or, that the latter obtaining makes it the case that the former obtains. Dasgupta
assumes two necessary conditions for grounding to hold:
a. Necessitation. "[T]he grounded is metaphysically necessitated by its
grounds".2
b. Whole relevance. "[A]ll parts of an explanationmust be explanatorily rele-
vant: if the X s ground theY s and x is one of the X s, then x is explanatorily
relevant to the Y s in the sense that x plays at least some role in making it
the case that theY s obtain".3
Necessitation and Whole Relevance play a crucial role in an argument that
leads Dasgupta to take a deeply revisionary stance concerning ground; I will
show this point in due course.
By Dasgupta’s own lights, there are two families of answers to Adams’s ques-
tion – when the latter is construed in terms of grounding. One may be an Indi-
vidualist, and claim that all fundamental facts are individualistic, while qualita-
tive facts are grounded thereof. Or, one may hold that all fundamental facts are
qualitative instead, and that individualistic facts are grounded thereof – hence
qualifying as aQualitativist. Dasguptadoesnot provide a thoroughly unambigu-
ous definition of the distinction between facts that are individualistic and facts
that are not (henceforth, the "individualistic distinction"); however, he does give
several hints towards the notion he has in mind:
"On this view [i.e., Individualism] the most basic, irreducible facts
about our world include facts about what individuals there are and
how they are propertied and related to one another, such as
a is F , b isG , a bears R to b
where a and b are individuals, or "primitive individuals" as I will call
them to underline their status on this view".4
"[R]oughly speaking a fact is individualistic iff whether it obtains de-
pends on how things stand with a particular individual (or individu-
als) and qualitative otherwise."5
2Dasgupta, (2014, p. 4)
3Dasgupta, (2014, p. 4)
4Dasgupta, (2009, p. 36)
5Dasgupta, (2014, p. 5)
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"[A fact] F is individualistic iff there is an x (or there are someX s) such
that whether F obtains depends on how things stand with x (or with
the X s)".6
Dasgupta does not advance a clear-cut definition of what an individual is, in
turn: he takes it to be enough for his aims that we think of individuals as "what
in ordinary English we call ’things’ – apples, alligators, atoms, and so on".7
Very roughly, we may think of qualitative facts as those facts that can be ex-
pressed in first order logic with identity but without constants; in order to ex-
press an individualistic fact, instead, we would need to refer to at least one indi-
vidual in particular (notmerely "to the thing that is so-and-so, whichever it may
be") – hence resorting to individual constants.8 Intuitively – and to mention an
example that is provided by Dasgupta himself – the fact that Obama is the pres-
ident counts as individualistic, while the fact that Someone is the president is a
qualitative one.
As I said, Dasgupta seems to assume that, faced with Adams’s question, one
may either take a qualitativist or an individualistic stance – under his own un-
derstanding of the two views. However, other alternatives seem to be available.
In particular, onemay simply aim to reject Qualitativism, hence claiming that at
least some individualistic facts are not grounded in qualitative facts. Taking this
stancewould be away to accept the second horn of Adams’s question in theway
that Adams himself seems to understand it. For it would amount to claiming
that the non-qualitative does hold a place at the fundamental level of reality –
without adding anything as to whether or not the purely qualitative contributes
to the fundamental level aswell. I will not focus on this point here, though. In ef-
fect, Dasgupta’s main purpose in the articles I am considering is to develop and
defend a form of Qualitativism he calls "Algebraic Generalism": his strategy to
that end does not really hinge on the definition of "Individualism" he accepts.
Dasgupta thinks that we should accept Qualitativism (in particular, Gener-
alism) because "if individualism were true then the individualistic facts of our
world would lie beyond our epistemic ken. (. . . ) [O]ur knowledge of the world is
limited to knowledge of its qualitative nature and whatever is grounded in that
qualitative nature, and since individualism implies that there are further facts
of the matter as to which particular individuals lie behind those qualities it fol-
lows that those facts would be unknowable".9 In other words, the individual-
ist takes there to be some facts that are neither qualitative nor grounded in the
qualitative – and according to Dasgupta such facts are beyond the limits of our
knowledge. Still in other terms, those individualistic facts that are not grounded
in qualitative facts would be such that the individuals they are about qualify as
6Dasgupta, (forth. fn.2)
7Dasgupta, (2014, p. 5)
8See Dasgupta, (2009, p. 40); Dasgupta, (2014, pp. 5-6); Dasgupta, (forth. P. 2)
9Dasgupta, (forth. P. 6)
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"primitive individuals". And, according to Dasgupta, it follows from any phys-
ical theory from Newton to this day that primitive individuals are "danglers":
they are "physically redundant and empirically undetectable".10 More precisely,
Dasgupta’s "argument from danglers", as I will call it, goes as follows:
(1) First premise. "It is a consequenceof everyphysical theory consideredover
the past 400 years that primitive individuals are danglers";11
(2) Second premise. "Consider two theories about the structure of the mate-
rial world, and suppose you discover that the first implies that the world
contains a dangler while the other does not. All else being equal, it is ratio-
nal for you to prefer the latter over the former";12
(3) Conclusion. "Thebenefit that generalismenjoysover individualism invirtue
of dispensing with danglers outweighs its putative costs".13
Dasgupta’s case for (1) is given through an argument by analogy between the
status of primitive individuals and the status of absolute velocity in Newtonian
Gravitation Theory. In a nutshell, the idea is that physical theories cannot help
us detect differences merely as to which individual in particular is involved in a
given observation, but only differences in the qualitative – just as they cannot
help us detect differences in absolute velocity, but only differences in relative
velocities.
With the additional premise that any view that accepts fundamental individ-
ualistic facts is committed toprimitive individuals14 the argument fromdanglers
seems to give us a reason for being suspicious about Individualism. In effect,
note that even the weaker individualist view that I considered above – the one
that merely amounts to a denial of Qualitativism – is committed to the funda-
mentality of some individualistic facts; hence, it will posit at least some primi-
tive individuals, in Dasgupta’s sense. For the defender of such a view will have it
that, for at least an individual, there is fact of the matter as to whether or not it
– as opposed to every other – is involved in some given fact (that is to say, in any
fact that qualifies as individualistic by being such that whether or not it obtains
depends on how things stand with that very individual in particular), and such
a fact of the matter cannot be said to rest on any collection of merely qualita-
tive considerations.15 The way I understand the argument from danglers, and
several other parts of Dasgupta’s dialectic, this is the idea behind the (at times
10Dasgupta, (2009, p. 40). I think that we may wish to define danglers as those entities that are,
more in general, explanatorily redundant and empirically undetectable; however, Dasgupta’s defi-
nitiondoes suit his aims in this passage, inasmuchashe focuses on redundancies inphysical theories
in particular.
11Dasgupta, (2009, p. 40)
12Dasgupta, (2009, p. 43)
13Dasgupta, (2009, p. 57)
14Dasgupta argues for this point at some length; see for instance Dasgupta, (2009, pp. 45-46).
15This point alludes, I think, to a further subtlety concerning the individualistic view that seems to
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confusing, I suggest) claim that there are (if Individualism is right) "primitive in-
dividuals". For there does not seem to bemuch that characterizes something as
a primitive individual, as opposed to an entity that is not, except for the fact that
only the former is involved inat least one individualistic fact that is not grounded
in qualitative facts. I will say more about this point in due course.
For now, note that the argument fromdanglers, the wayDasgupta phrases it,
seems to do more than just single out an epistemic vice intrinsic to Individual-
ism: Dasgupta takes it to support a particular form of Qualitativism that he calls
"Generalism".
A generalist view – as opposed to some forms of Qualitativism such as the
bundle theory – does not even attempt to give a story about how individuals can
be said to consist in other, purely qualitative, items. It just focuses on the facts
that can be said to build up the fundamental level of reality – that is, given the
qualitativist dictum, only qualitative ones – and on how they should be properly
characterized. The view that Dasgupta labels "Quantifier Generalism" provides
a first suggestion in this sense: the idea is that the fundamental facts are all and
only those facts that can be expressed in first-order logic with identity but with-
out constants. Consider the infamous case of a "Black’s world": nothing exists
in such a world but two qualitatively indiscernible spheres. The bundle theorist
is still committed to what may be seen, in Dasgupta’s spirit, as a sort of "original
sin": she aims to build up individuals out of qualities. Faced with Black’s world,
she will have no choice but to recognize a sole individual that is built out of a
certain collection of compresent qualities (for the same collection lies behind
the "two" spheres) – hence accepting a substantive version of the identity of in-
discernibles (henceforth, PII). However, the quantifier generalist can just embed
the idea that there are two spheres in her own description of Black’s world – the
latter will be something like:
(Q.G.) ∃x∃y (x , y ∧ Fx ∧ F y ∧Hxy )
where "F" conveys a complete qualitative description of each sphere, and "H"
expresses the relation of being at, say, nine metres from one another.16 And
since the description mentions only what the quantifier generalist takes to be
qualitative facts, she can claim that her account is indeed a qualitativist one.
However, according to Dasgupta this suggestion does not go far enough in
getting rid of primitive individuals. For not only we naturally take quantified ex-
pressions to range on a domain of individuals, and may doubt that a satisfying
lie beyond Dasgupta’s own aims: one may indeed wish to deny Qualitativism, and still hold that no
individualistic fact is fundamental, as long as none of them is grounded in qualitative facts, but only
in other individualistic ones. Developing in detail and defending such an idea, though, would lead
one to deny that grounding is a strict partial order – either by rejecting the transitivity of ground, or
by negating there to be any fundamental level. I will not further focus on this point here.
16See Dasgupta, (2009, pp. 49-50); Dasgupta, (2014); Dasgupta, (forth. P. 7).
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alternative understanding is available;17 it may also well be (and many do be-
lieve) that quantified facts are grounded in their instances. If this were the case,
then any fact that can be expressed as "there is a sphere" would be grounded on
the fact that a certain sphere in particular exists – hence, contra the quantifier
generalist, no such fact would be fundamental.18 Moreover, at least intuitively,
if the qualitative facts are to be understood in terms of a domain of individuals,
or evenworse if they are grounded in their instances – i.e., in facts concerning at
least one given individual in particular – it is not so clear how (if at all) one can
claim that such facts constitute the fundamental level of realitywithout commit-
ting to the idea that the worldmust be accounted for in terms of some primitive
individuals after all.
Nothing like this happens with Algebraic Generalism – i.e., with the form of
Qualitativism that Dasgupta aims to defend. According to Algebraic General-
ism, nothing exists at the fundamental level but a domain of n-adic properties;
these are arranged in a certain structure that can be described via formulas of
a particular language G that well suits the Generalist’s metaphysics. Dasgupta
draws the relevant formal language from Quine’s Algebraic Logic and Predicate
Functors.19 Very roughly, the peculiarity of language G can be summarized as
follows:
i. it can mimic first-order quantification in a way that does not seem – at
least prima facie – to bring in problems concerning whether or not one is
quantifying on a domain of individuals: since there are no quantifiers, and
the element of G that mimics them does not take any argument, there is
no question as to "what ranges on what", so to say;
ii. it does not treat properties as predicates but as terms – so there is no ques-
tion as to whether predicates apply to individuals either;
iii. all of its syntactic symbols apply to such terms for properties – so that,
again, there seems to be no space for a mention of individuals in G’s for-
mulas.
Without getting into technical details, I will just show as an example a for-
mula of G that the algebraic generalist may use to represent what is going on in
Black’s world – by mentioning qualitative facts alone:
(A.G.) cc (F 1 ∧ pF 1 ∧ ¬I 2)obt ains
(where "F" conveys a complete qualitative description of each sphere – for sim-
plicity, I will assume that such a description captures not only the intrinsic qual-
itative properties of each sphere, but also the relational ones).
17Cf. Dasgupta, (2009, p. 50).
18See Dasgupta, (2009, p. 50); Dasgupta, (forth. Pp. 7-8).
19Quine, (1976)
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Very roughly, the formula may be understood as saying something like "the
fact that it F-izes, and it F-izes, and it numerical-difference-izes obtains".20 The
two "c" at the beginning of the formula stand for as many applications of the
"cropping operator": its role is to cancel an argument-place in a given property’s
adicity. As a result, from an n-adic predicate that we would naturally think as
applying ton individuals we can get to have a term that seems to stand by itself –
this seems to confirm that we can describe Black’s world throughG by assuming
properties alone (and without taking the two spheres to be one and the same).
Intuitively, an application of the cropping operator in G is, by the same token,
what mimics an existential quantification of first-order logic.21
I said that, according toAlgebraicGeneralism, at the fundamental level prop-
erties are arranged in a structure that may be described through formulas of G.
Itmay have soundedmore natural to say that, throughG, we can combine prop-
erties in order to constructmore complex properties – and, via them, qualitative
facts. However, I suggest that this would fail to effectivelymirror the fundamen-
tal reality as conceived by Dasgupta’s metaphysics. In effect, according to Das-
gupta, the best form of Qualitativism – Algebraic Generalism – naturally goes
with both a structuralist and a radically holistic conception of reality. In a nut-
shell, if one aims to accept Algebraic Generalist without taking an eliminativist
stance about individualistic facts, one should accept (Dasgupta says):
– Structuralism about (individuals and) individualistic facts. An account of
one individualistic fact is by the same token an account of all of them.22
– Radical Holism. The world is fundamentally a single whole. At rock bot-
tom, the only fundamental fact is that a single complex state of affairs that
characterizes thewholeworld obtains. Distinct atomic factsmay still hold,
but they are not fundamental; they obtain in virtue of that sole one funda-
mental fact.23
I will not focus on the reasonswhyGeneralism entails Radical Holismhere.24
As for Structuralism, the point should be connected to another crucial fea-
ture of Dasgupta’s metaphysics – in particular, to his conception of grounding
for individualistic facts. According to Dasgupta, if Qualitativism is right then the
individualistic facts are plurally and non-distributively grounded in the quali-
tative facts: the plurality of the individualistic facts that obtain is, collectively,
20It would feelmuchmore natural to talk about the fact that there is F-ness, and there is F-ness, and
there is numerical difference, instead – but this would not fit Dasgupta’s aims because, under such a
description, that fact would turn out to look like a quantificational one.
21LanguageGplays a crucial role inDasgupta’s theory and I did notmake justice to its subtleties at
all. For details, see in particular Dasgupta, (2009): "Appendix on language G", and of course Quine,
(1976).
22See Dasgupta, (2014, pp. 10-11).
23See Dasgupta, (2009, pp. 55-56, 58).
24For Dasgupta’s very neat argument to this end, see Dasgupta, (2009, pp. 55-56).
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grounded in the plurality of the qualitative facts that obtain, though no indi-
vidualistic fact, considered by itself, has a qualitative ground of its own. And
of course this turns into amodus ponens by Dasgupta’s lights, for the argument
from danglers was supposed to show us that Qualitativism is right indeed. As
a consequence, Dasgupta rejects Singularism about ground: according to his
view, not only the grounds of a fact, but also what is grounded can be a plural-
ity.25 Roughly, his argument for thismove is the following – I will call it "Obama’s
argument".
Suppose Qualitativism is right. Consider then some individualistic fact, say
– in line with Dasgupta’s own suggestion – the fact that Obama exists; call it
S. Given Qualitativism, and the mainstream assumption that, although what
grounds can be a plurality of facts, what is grounded is always one single fact –
given, that is, Singularism about ground –wewould expect there to be some col-
lection of qualitative factsQ that collectively ground S. However, remember the
two constraints on grounding that Dasgupta does assume: Necessitation and
Whole Relevance. According to Dasgupta, nothing short of the collection of all
the qualitative facts obtaining at our world – if anything – will be enough to ne-
cessitate the fact that Obama exists. Yet even that collection (call it "Big Q") will
fail to ground S. For of course not every part of Big Q will be relevant for an ex-
planation of S – there are of course qualitative facts about galaxies far far away
that would be irrelevant for an explanation of Obama’s existence, and yet such
facts are, indeed, part of Big Q. More in general – so the thought goes – there is
no way to save both Necessitation and Whole Relevance if we aim to argue that
every individualistic fact is grounded, by itself, in some collection of qualitative
facts.26
However, there is an easy way out if we accept that grounding can be plural
and non-distributive. Consider again Big Q. We said that Big Q fails to ground S
because (many) parts of the former are not relevant for an explanation of the
latter. This seems to openly contradict the qualitativist credo: there are, one
would say, individualistic facts that do not have a qualitative ground – S is one of
them. Yet this is not the whole story. In effect, S is a counterexample to Qualita-
tivism only inasmuch as Qualitativism is held together with Singularism about
ground – that is, only if one assumes that every individualistic fact must be by
itself grounded in the qualitative. On the other hand, if what is grounded – and
not only what grounds – can be a plurality of facts, accepting that S by itself fails
to be grounded in the qualitativemay pose no deep problem to the qualitativist.
Intuitively, what the qualitativist needs to exclude is that some aspects of reality
are neither part of Big Q nor settled by it, so to speak. Now, consider a further
collection of facts: the collection of all the individualistic facts that obtain – call
25See Dasgupta, (2014, pp. 3-4); Dasgupta, (forth. Pp. 10-11).
26See Dasgupta, (2014, pp. 8-11).
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it "Big S". As opposed to what happened with S, it is easy to ascribe a qualitative
ground to Big S without contravening either Necessitation or Whole Relevance:
Big Q will be said to be such a ground. Every part of Big Q will of course be rel-
evant for explaining some part of Big S. In fact, intuitively, the two collections
may be taken as describing exactly one and the same portion of reality: Big Q
captures a complete qualitative description of our whole world, while Big S cap-
tures a complete individualistic one. Moreover, given Qualitativism and given
that every qualitative feature of our world is part of Big Q, every part of reality
that is not part of Big Q must be grounded in – hence, also necessitated by –
it. (It may be relevant to recall that Dasgupta’s point here is a conditional one:
"if the world is fundamentally qualitative, then the individualistic facts are plu-
rally grounded in the qualitative".27 The reasons for accepting Qualitativism in
the first place should be sought elsewhere – according to Dasgupta, in the ar-
gument from danglers). Consider now S again. By claiming that Big Q grounds
Big S, the qualitativist does exclude that any part of reality can fail to be either
part of Big Q or settled by it. For every part of reality that is not part of Big Q is
part of a plurality that is grounded in Big Q – i.e., of Big S. Even S is part of Big S
– hence, its not having a qualitative ground of its own need not pose a problem
to the qualitativist credo: by being part of a plurality that is grounded in Big Q, S
itself is, so to say, indirectly settled by Big Q.28
It seems, then, thatQualitativismcommitsone to rejectingSingularismabout
ground – and the latter move is undeniably controversial. Intuitively (and very
roughly), Dasgupta asks us to hold together two ideas that, at least prima fa-
cie, seem to contradict one another: first, that all of the individualistic facts are,
taken collectively, grounded in the qualitative, so that no individualistic fact of
our world is fundamental; second, that it is not the case that each individualistic
fact is grounded in the qualitative – call these two claims, together, Plural Quali-
tativeGround (PQG, for short). As I tried to showabove, there is no contradiction
in PQG if Singularism is dropped – that is, if one accepts that a plurality of facts
may bemetaphysically explained although none of those very facts, considered
in itself, has a metaphysical explanation of its own.
Now, according to Dasgupta, "claims about the logical form of ground (like
Singularism) are highly abstract claims about the nature of explanation, and it is
not at all clear why we should take our pre-theoretic opinions about that sort of
thing seriously".29 I disagree with this claim – I think that it is quite unavoidable
to feel likeDasgupta isnot properly providing uswith an explanationof a certain
domain of facts (the individualistic facts), if we cannot point to any single fact of
the domain and ask what the relevant explanation for that one fact in particular
27Dasgupta, (2014, pp. 2-3).
28More precisely, Dasgupta talks of a sense inwhichBig S "account for" S, by grounding a plurality
(the one I am labelling Big S) that has S as a logical consequence. See Dasgupta, (2014, p. 11).
29Dasgupta, (2014, p. 13)
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is. One may also wish to contend that our reticence to accept PQG does not
merely amount to an abstract conviction about the logical form of grounding at
all. If there are individualistic facts that do not have any qualitative ground, then
all those very facts are asmany features of reality that are neither qualitative nor
grounded in the qualitative – one would wish to say.
However, itmust be noted that trying to pursue this sort of intuitions in order
to argue against Dasgupta’s viewwould be to beg the question against his whole
strategy. For that move would in effect amount to plainly rejecting the idea that
an explanation in general, hence also a metaphysical explanation in particular,
may fail to be singular – or at least to contending that an explanation, if plural,
must surely be distributive. It would amount to asserting that, if a given domain
of facts is explained as a collection, then it just cannot be the case that none
of the facts that take part in that collection have an explanation of their own.
Which would simply be to deny that an explanation might be plural and non-
distributive. Perhaps the notion of explanation as plural and non-distributive is
deeply problematic – but if one’s aim is to argue against a defence of it, then in-
dependent reasons shouldbeprovided for thus thinking. Still, I find it significant
that this sort of intuition – i.e., the intuition that, so to say, there is no explana-
tion without distributive explanation – is so deeply rooted in our natural way to
conceive of what an explanation should in general be. And – I shall stress again
– our way to conceive of explanation in general is largely independent from the
theory of grounding – at least insofar as the features of grounding as a highly
abstract, formal notion are concerned.
In connection to this, consider Obama’s argument again. Dropping Singu-
larism provides a solution insofar as the Qualitativist can claim that, even if no
collection of qualitative facts can ground S, S together with every other obtain-
ing individualistic fact can indeed be said to be grounded in the qualitative: by
considering this new individualistic item– the collection that I calledBig Sabove
– we get to fulfil the Whole Relevance condition. Now, one may wish to protest
that this amounts to explaining something completely different from what we
had been trying to explain in the first place: we started off trying to metaphysi-
cally explain S, the fact that Obama exists, and we ended up with an answer to
a completely different question – i.e., to the question of what qualitative facts
metaphysically explain Big S, the whole of the individualistic facts of our world.
Yet this consideration, again, cannot be held against Dasgupta on pain of beg-
ging the question against him. For his point is exactly that the individualistic
facts canbe grounded in thequalitative only plurally andnon-distributively, and
the claim that theymust be grounded in the qualitative is supposed to be justi-
fied by other means – that is, by the argument from danglers. And still, it is hard
not to feel like rejecting Singularism lets us solve theproblem thatObama’s argu-
ment presents merely by playing a formal trick – that is, by explaining together
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several facts that fail to belong together. For instance, we end up explaining to-
gether S and a number of individualistic facts concerning galaxies far far away
that seem to be utterly unrelated to S. Perhaps the intuition that this cannot be
right should not be trusted. But if this is the case, then one may doubt that we
can trust our intuitions as to what is relevant to what, between the grounding
and the grounded – given that, when we look at the level of what is grounded
alone, anything can be combined with anything in order to let us get the right
result. And of course there are passages in Obama’s argument that do – at least
in part – hinge on intuitions of that sort. In effect, while looking for a plurality of
qualitative facts that can be taken as a ground of S, Dasgupta remarks that:
"[S]urely what happens in Alpha Centauri plays no role in making it
the case that Obama exists. (. . . ) [W]e are asking for a grounding ex-
planation of Obama’s existence and it is almost inconceivable that
the correct answer could include the goings on outside our solar sys-
tem".30
Weshould then reject a view thathas it that individualistic facts aboutObama
are explainedbyqualitative facts aboutAlphaCentauri. But ifwe agreewithDas-
gupta on this particular point, thenwemay also find a doctrine that explains in-
dividualistic facts about Obama and individualistic facts about Alpha Centauri
together – and only together – even less desirable. And yet, again, if Dasgupta
is right then the individualistic facts are such that they can be metaphysically
explained by the qualitative only "all at once" – so to say. If one takes this to be
too heavy a theoretical cost (and if Obama’s argument is sound, as it does seem
to be), then one will presumably have to target the very claim that individualis-
tic facts are grounded in the qualitative. And since the argument from danglers,
that is supposed to support the claim, is a ceteris paribus one, a good strategy
will most likely be that of questioning the idea that, whenwe compare Individu-
alism and Qualitativism, "all things but the acceptance of primitive individuals
are equal". Accepting such danglers as primitive individuals may be a theoreti-
cal cost, but it is not yet utterly clear that Structuralism and the consequent loss
of Singularism about explanation are much less serious a worry.
As a final remark, I suggest that theremay be some problems concerning the
individualistic distinction as stated by Dasgupta. As I said, Dasgupta does not
provide us with a properly clear-cut distinction between the two alleged cate-
gories of facts – although, as I argued above, the very notion of a primitive indi-
vidual, which substantiates the main rationale for rejecting Individualism, cru-
cially depends upon it. At most, we are given an extensional criterion: all those
facts that may be expressed in first order logic with identity but without con-
stants are qualitative, while any other fact is individualistic. Yet importantly,
30Dasgupta, (2014, p. 9)
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this cannot be the end of the story by the Generalist’s own lights: for, given a
widely accepted principle, existentially quantified facts are grounded in their
instances and cannot, therefore, be fundamental. Hence Dasgupta’s resorting
to the algebraic language G. But this move would better be more than just a for-
mal artifice: after all, every sentence of first-order logic without constants but
with identity has a translation in G and vice versa. Some independent theoreti-
cal reason should be given to think that the right description of the qualitative is
provided by G and not by first order logic. To put it differently: we were told that
the facts that can be expressed by a certain language coincide with the qualita-
tive facts, but also that they cannot be the qualitative facts, because they are not
good candidates for being fundamental. Then we were given a translation of all
of those facts, and we were told that in such new clothes those facts can be said
to be fundamental. But whatmakes them qualify as qualitative in the first place
is still unclear.
On the face of it, it looks like themain theoretical hallmark of G concerns the
ontological commitment it seems to bring forth: as opposed to their counter-
parts of first order logic, the sentencesofGare thought tomentiononlyqualities,
and they do not seem to demand for a domain of individuals at all. Now, given
this picture, perhaps the facts that we were brought to identify as qualitative –
the facts that can be expressed in G – are eligible to be fundamental indeed. And
yet, I shall argue, it is far from clear that by claiming that they are the only fun-
damental facts one does get rid of primitive individuals in the sense that should
be relevant for the argument from danglers. Indeed, Dasgupta seems to assume
that only facts that involve individualsmay give rise to those alleged danglers he
calls "primitive individuals" – hence, that if there are no fundamental individ-
uals then there are no primitive individuals (call this "the individuals’ assump-
tion"). Coherently with this, he first presents his Generalism as a fundamentally
"individual-less view of thematerial world".31 Still coherently with this, he takes
it that the qualities that constitute the fundamental level of reality are universals,
thereby blocking the way to any kind of nominalistic reduction.32
Now, I think there are good reasons for thinking that the individuals’ assump-
tion iswrong. I also think that once such reasons are duly appreciated, Algebraic
Generalism loses much of its appeal.
In order to make this point, let me advance a suggestion as to how we may
characterize those entities that the argument from danglers is supposed to tar-
get, withouthelpingourselves to adistinctionbetween facts that is yet tobe clear
and without appealing to a discrimination between categories of entities that
I am trying to prove irrelevant. Suppose the whole qualitative story about the
world is given. If and only if there is at least an entity such that some question
31Dasgupta, (2009, p. 35)
32Cf. Dasgupta, (2009, pp. 47-48).
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concerning its identitymay nonetheless still arise, there is – under the construal
I am advancing – one of those entities that the argument from danglers is sup-
posed to target (I shall keep labelling them "primitive individuals" for the sake
of simplicity, but it should be kept inmind that, contrary towhatDasgupta does,
I am not presupposing that they belong to a certain category – individuals – as
opposed to others anymore).33
I take the following claims of Dasgupta’s to support my proposal:
"For example, consider the following system: a primitive individual
calledPeter is at an initial time t0 propelledup in theair bya slingshot,
only to fall by gravity back to Earth. And now consider a different
system whose initial state at t0 differs only in the fact that a different
primitive individual, Paul, is slung. By hypothesis, we are to suppose
that Peter and Paul have the same mass, shape, charge and so on.
(. . . ) [I]f the two systems both obey NGT, then Paul will make exactly
the same trajectory through space as Peter. According to NGT, the
identity of each particle makes no difference to how the slingshot or
the Earth’s gravitational field affect it".34
"[I]magine a situation in which (. . . ) a primitive individual is placed
in front of you. (. . . ) [S]uppose that it is a chair. And now imagine
a situation in which everything is exactly the same except that a dif-
ferent primitive individual is in front of you. Suppose this different
individual has exactly the same qualities as the actual chair in front
of you: imagine it were colored the same, shaped the same, and so
on. (. . . ) [T]he situation would look and feel and smell exactly the
same to you: we cannot tell the difference between situations that
differ only in their individualistic facts".35
Dasgupta is here illustrating his claim that primitive individuals are danglers:
in both passages, I argue, what is indicated as (first) explanatory redundant and
(second) empirically undetectable is a difference in the identity of the entities
involved in a given observation that is not accompanied by any qualitative dif-
ference. In line with such hints, according to the construal I am advancing there
are no primitive individuals if and only if, once the whole qualitative asset of
the world is given, every fact concerning the identity of the existing entities is
settled.
33I suspect that some may find the phrase "questions as concerns its identity" confusing. If so,
think of specific instances of such questions: e.g., of questions as to whether or not it, as opposed to
any other entity of the same kind, exist, or as to whether it is involved in some given phenomenon,
fact, or observation – or, as to whether it is identical to some entity from another possible world in
particular, and so forth.
34Dasgupta, (2009, p. 41). Here, NGT stands for "Newtonian Gravitation Theory".
35Dasgupta, (2009, p. 42)
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It can now be seen why there are reasons for rejecting the individuals’ as-
sumption. First, note that one may well accept individuals in her ontology –
even at the fundamental level! – and yet still exclude there to be any primitive
individual in the sense I have described.36 I think that Leibniz’s metaphysics
maywell be seen as a view of this sort. On the one hand, the entities that Leibniz
calls "individual substances" arguably are individuals under any understanding
of the term that has been considered to this day. At least under a certain inter-
pretation – one that was endorsed, to give but one example, in Di Bella, (2005)37
– such entities do constitute the fundamental ontology in Leibniz’s system. On
the other hand, it seems that something like Dasgupta’s argument from dan-
glers would be harmless against them. For any fact of the matter as concerns
their identity is completely settled by the qualitative – via complete individual
concepts that are purely qualitative; each one of them corresponds to one indi-
vidual substance and, so to say, fix its identity by completely characterizing its
nature.
Secondly, note that the assumption that universals are the sole fundamental
entities is not only, givenwhat I just said, dispensable if one’s aim is that of ruling
out primitive individuals: it is also, by itself, insufficient as ameans to rule them
out. For, pace what Dasgupta says about the advantage of his view over the bun-
dle theory in this concern, theGeneralist will still have to assume something like
PII about the entities she takes as fundamental – for she needs to exclude that
some of them may be qualitatively indiscernible though numerically different.
Otherwise, some fact concerning their identitywould fail to be fixed by the qual-
itative, hence giving rise to primitive individuals. And although the idea that
something like PII is almost trivially verified by such entities as universals has
been more or less taken for granted in the general debate, it has recently been
challenged, with quite convincing reasons, by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra.38
A possible upshot of these considerations, I suggest, is the following: if one
is convinced by the argument fromdanglers, it seems that one has good reasons
36The point was very neatly put by Boris Kment: "Anti-individualists reject fundamental individ-
ualist facts. But they are free to accept that individuals exist. They may even include individuals in
their fundamental ontology, by holding that, in stating the fundamental facts, we need to quantify
over individuals. (. . . ) The view could perhaps be stated by saying that, even fundamentally speak-
ing, there are indeed individuals, but there are no fundamental facts aboutwhich individual any one
of them is. Individuals are, as it were, mere anonymous loci of instantiation of qualitative properties
and relations, nameless pegs on which we can hang these properties and that we can connect by
these relations. They are individuals without individuality." – see Kment, (2012, p. 579). As a mat-
ter of fact, I happen to think that Leibniz, whom I take to both accept individuals as fundamental
entities and defend a form of Qualitativism, wanted his fundamental individuals to be more than
nameless pegs and to partake of individuality, to some extent – I think that his theory of individual
concepts has been, in part, his way to fulfil such a theoretical intent. However, such an exegetical
point lies beyond the scope of the present essay.
37See, in particular, pp. 23-33.
38Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra, (2016).
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to prefer a more traditional form of Qualitativism such as (what I take to be)
Leibniz’s over Algebraic Generalism. The two square equally well in getting rid
of primitive individuals; both are committed to PII as concerns the fundamental
entities; yet – arguablywith somewhat dubious reasons – the latter alonedirectly
excludes any formof nominalismabout properties (not tomention other deeply
revisionary stances it takes, such as Structuralism and Radical Holism).
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